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Commentary/Pickering and Garrod: Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue
lexical distinctions – follows from this definition of lexical content.
A word with both double-object and full-dative variants provides
two distinct forms of update onto a single structure, hence a processing ambiguity. Repeating words across interlocutors will retrieve the lexical specification just used, not some alternant. By
collapsing what would in other systems be discrete syntactic/semantic/lexical levels, the multilevel nature of alignment is transformed into a single phenomenon.
We can now see perception/production correspondences and
self-monitoring of production as essential, not merely functionally
convenient. The consequences of taking parsing as basic when designing a production model are twofold. First, in using the same
grammar formalism, the production mechanism must be using the
same structure-inducing growth process as is articulated for parsing, the major difference being that in production, the goal tree is
known. Following general tree development steps defined by the
parser, which in the initial steps of the parse define only a skeletal
partial tree, the task is to retrieve from the lexicon some appropriate first word that can take the partial tree so far defined and
update it to provide a more developed structure that subsumes the
goal tree. If such a subsumption relation holds, then utterance of
that word is licensed. This task repeats itself to induce a sequence
of words until the goal tree is obtained through the parse mechanism – hence the correspondence between comprehension and
production and essential self-monitoring in production.1
Alignment between interlocutors is now explicable. The major
challenge of production, given some conceptual structure to be
communicated, is selecting words to express that content, imposing a general lexicon search. The incrementality of the tree growth
mechanisms suggests that this search is activated successively,
which is a huge task. However, production, like parsing, is contextdependent; and part of the context is that small subset of the
lexicon already accessed. Repeating words accordingly avoids a
general lexicon search. Pronouns equally, being place-holders
substituted by contextually available representations, sidestep full
lexicon access. And with elliptical fragments, lexical search is restricted to the fragment. So the high rate of alignment, as displayed by these forms, arises because production, following the
parsing dynamics, is context-dependent, which is essential for
minimizing the word-retrieval burden.
Finally, shared utterances are expected. Given the use of parsing tools to induce production steps, in successful communication,
interlocutors must coincide on constructing some particular sequence of structures. The shift from parser to producer is thus
straightforward if the parser, having constructed some partial tree,
makes an abduction step to determine what is needed to complete
it. The shift from producer to parser is equally natural: It is a shift
into the task of processing lexical input to complete the partial
tree, which up to that point was constructed as the means of making production choices.
Hence, there is a stronger conclusion than the authors’ modest
challenge to linguists. Rather, we might adopt methodologies in
which linguistic theories are evaluated by their potential for expressing coordination of comprehension and production in dialogue. Grammar formalisms defined in terms of parsing meet this
challenge in a particularly direct way.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic theory of dialogue
attempts to detail the psychological processes involved in communication
that are lacking in Clark’s theory. By relying on automatic priming and
alignment processes, however, the theory falters when it comes to explaining much of dialogic interaction. We argue for the inclusion of less
automatic, though not completely conscious and deliberate, processes to
explain such phenomena.

In his influential book Using Language, Clark (1996) argued
against a conceptualization of communicators as autonomous information processors, contending that language use is intrinsically
a joint activity and examining communicators’ practices from this
perspective. His account provides a compelling description of
some of the things talkers accomplish in dialogue, but it is weak
on details of the psychological processes on which these accomplishments rest. Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic theory
of dialogue is an attempt to provide such an account. In many respects, it is quite successful, providing a glimmer of light at the
end of a long psycholinguistic tunnel. However, there are some respects in which the theory falls short of its authors’ goal of providing a mechanistic explanation for the phenomena Clark described.
There are two key propositions in the target article’s argument:
first, that communication entails the alignment of participants’ situation models; second, that priming is the principle mechanism
by which this is accomplished. We find the first proposition more
convincing than the second. By stressing the automaticity of the
process, P&G’s mechanistic theory appears incapable of accounting for the way interlocutors use information in what appears to
be a more reflective fashion. Because of space limitations, we shall
confine ourselves to just a few instances where the theory is deficient.
1. The automatic priming mechanism appears to leave no room
for addressee accommodation in the absence of a misunderstanding, yet there are many examples of interlocutors taking their partners’ informational needs into account that are incompatible with
automatic priming. For example, Kingsbury (1968) found that
Bostonians who were asked, “I’m from out of town, can you tell
me how to get to Jordan Marsh?” gave more detailed directions
than those simply asked, “Can you tell me how to get to Jordan
Marsh?” When asked the latter question in an exotic (nonlocal) dialect, Bostonians also gave more detailed directions. Fussell and
Krauss (1992) found that the number of words used in the initial
reference to a photo of a landmark in an interactive coordination
task was a function of the landmark’s perceived identifiability – the
more identifiable the landmark was thought to be, the fewer the
words used to refer to it. It is not clear how priming could account
for these results or those of a host of similar studies (see Krauss &
Fussell 1996 for a review). We believe that such “audience design”
effects (Clark & Murphy 1982; Fussell & Krauss 1989) occur prior
to referent selection, and not just as an attempt to remedy an
emergent misunderstanding.
2. Representational alignment requires that two or more entities be identical in some way. Assertions of identity may work for
descriptions of relatively abstract syntactic and lexical levels of
representation, but not for representations at the phonological
level, because the phonological level is graded and repeated phonetic elements (even within the same talker) are not physically
identical. Although different instances of a phoneme may be perceived as members of the same phoneme category, perception
preserves some phonetic distinctions. Hence, the very level that is
the point of contact between talkers, the acoustic-phonetic level,
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cannot support an automatic alignment/imitation-based model
because it is impossible to produce a perfect imitation – the monitoring system would be reporting continual error. Although the
mechanism allows for degrees of alignment, we lack a rule for determining how much alignment is required.
Interestingly, the strongest evidence cited by P&G for phonetic
alignment comes from Goldinger’s (1998) study of lexical shadowing. However, Goldinger’s procedure assessed perceived imitation, which is not equivalent to phonetic similarity. Imitations of
the voices of well-known figures by vocal impressionists are caricatures that exaggerate particularly salient features rather than
produce acoustically accurate reproductions. The remainder of
the published evidence for phonological imitation is mainly of increased similarity in speech rate and pitch (Giles et al. 1991; Natale 1975a; 1975b) and voice onset timing (Sancier & Fowler
1997). In a continuously variable system, what degree of similarity constitutes an imitation?
3. Interlocutors’ speech does not always become more similar
over the course of their interaction; in some cases, interaction
yields divergence rather than convergence. Moreover, the speech
of different participants may change to different degrees; convergence can be radically asymmetrical. It would be little more than
an annoyance if such departures from symmetrical convergence
were random, but frequently they reflect social processes that are
fundamental to the interlocutors’ interpersonal relationship and
the ways in which they define the interaction situation. For example, Bourhis and Giles (1977) found divergence in accentedness
when a talker’s ethnic identity was devalued. Gregory and Webster (1996) found that the symmetry of pitch convergence between a talk-show host and his guests depended on the guest’s status relative to that of the host – not surprisingly, higher-status
guests changed less than their lower-status counterparts. Again, it
is difficult to reconcile such phenomena with an automatic priming explanation. It seems more plausible to suppose that they derive from a prior assessment that sets up the system to evoke particular kinds of priming.
Although our commentary is directed at what we see as deficiencies in P&G’s theory, we applaud their attempt to move beyond participants’ goals and intentions and focus on the psychological mechanisms that make dialogue possible. Their thoughtful
article is admirable in both its scope and depth, and offers much
to contemplate. A complete account, we believe, will require a hybrid model in which alignment or imitation derives from both the
kinds of automatic processes they describe and processes that are
more directed or reflective. Hybrid models of this sort may be less
tidy (although not necessarily less mechanistic) than the one P&G
propose, but they do seem necessary to capture the subtlety and
richness of dialogic phenomena. We are reminded of an anecdote
about French President François Mitterand, who, when asked by
an acquaintance if she might address him using the personal tu
form, responded, “Si vous voulez.” Even in cooperative settings
without misunderstanding, alignment may be used strategically –
language is used in the pursuit of individual goals. An elaboration
of how a situation model incorporates key aspects of social and interpersonal dynamics would increase the explanatory power of a
mechanistic theory of dialogue.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) suggest that communicators synchronize their processing at a number of linguistic levels. Whereas their
explanation suggests that representations are being compared across individuals, there must be some representation of all conversation participants
in each participant’s head. At the level of the situation model, it is important to maintain separate representations for each participant. At other levels, it seems less crucial to have a separate representation for each participant. This analysis suggests that different mechanisms may synchronize
representations at different linguistic levels.
Introduction. The core of Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) article
is illustrated in their Figure 2. Participants in a conversation are
attempting to achieve alignment between linguistic representations at the phonetic, lexical, semantic, and discourse levels simultaneously. Two key questions arise from this figure. First, what
sorts of representations are being aligned; and second, how is this
alignment achieved?
What is being aligned? The target article’s Figure 2 illustrates
that linguistic representations at a variety of levels are aligned. The
authors suggest that representations from one participant’s head
are aligned directly with those from the other participant’s head.
This notation is a convenient shorthand, but people cannot directly access each other’s mental states. To make this model work
as it is drawn, participants must keep track separately of their own
knowledge at these levels, as well as the knowledge of other participants.
For some levels of discourse, this separation is more critical
than others. For the situation model, it is important that speakers
know what information is possessed by the listener. This information is crucial for ensuring that given new conventions are followed when generating sentences, for ensuring that new utterances are relevant to the discourse, and for maintaining common
ground (Clark 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1986). A key question is
the degree of information participants must have about their partner’s knowledge (Keysar 1994; Keysar et al. 1998).
At other linguistic levels, the distinction between one’s own
knowledge and that of a partner may be less crucial. It may not be
necessary to distinguish between one’s own grammatical constructions and those of a partner. Similarly, representations of
phonology and prosody of speech need not be kept separate in order to process a discourse. This distinction in the knowledge required to process and use language for the situation model as opposed to grammatical or phonetic representations suggests that
these levels may differ in the degree to which people are aware of
the effects of alignment. In particular, people may recognize that
they have designed their utterances to convey particular kinds of
information that their partner does not have. In contrast, they may
be unaware that the grammatical, phonological, or prosodic form
of one sentence has been influenced by the form of a sentence
spoken previously by a partner.
How are representations aligned? The target article refers to
the process that synchronizes participants’ linguistic representations as alignment. The discussion of the roles of linguistic representations in the previous section suggests that there may not be
a single alignment mechanism at work. In particular, the discourse-level representation (e.g., the situation model) is the only
one that really seems to require a separate representation of what
is known by each conversational participant. In contrast, the lower
levels of representation need not have distinct representations for
each participant.
When there are separate representations for each conversa-

